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Abstract: Experiments on choice blindness support von Hippel &
Trivers’s (VH&T’s) conception of the mind as fundamentally divided,
but they also highlight a problem for VH&T’s idea of non-conscious
self-deception: If I try to trick you into believing that I have a certain
preference, and the best way is to also trick myself, I might actually
end up having that preference, at all levels of processing.
The classic paradox of self-deception is how the self can be both
deceiver and deceived. Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) solve this
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conundrum by appealing to the separation of implicit and explicit
processes in the mind; I cannot knowingly deceive myself, but the
non-conscious part of my mind can “deceive” me by pursuing
goals that are contradictory to my consciously stated ambitions.
VH&T identify and draw support from three different areas
of research: explicit versus implicit memory, explicit versus
implicit attitudes, and controlled versus automatic processes.
None of these processes are inherently self-deceptive. Instead,
as VH&T write: “These mental dualisms do not themselves
involve self-deception, but each of them plays an important
role in enabling self-deception” (sect. 4, para. 1).
We suggest adding a fourth set of related studies: work on
choice blindness – that is, the failure to detect mismatches
between a choice made and the outcome received (Johansson
et al., 2005). Choice blindness is an experimental paradigm
inspired by techniques from the domain of close-up card
magic, which permits a surreptitious manipulation of the
relationship between choice and outcome that the participants
experience. The participants in Johansson et al. (2005) were
asked to choose which of two pair-wise presented faces they
found most attractive. Immediately after, they were also asked
to describe the reasons for their choice. Unknown to the partici-
pants, on certain trials, a double-card ploy was used to covertly
exchange one face for the other. Thus, on these trials, the
outcome of the choice became the opposite of what they
intended. Remarkably, in the great majority of trials, the partici-
pants were blind to the mismatch between choice and outcome,
while nevertheless being able to offer elaborate reasons for their
choices. The two classes of reports were analysed on a number of
different dimensions, such as the level of effort, emotionality,
specificity, and certainty expressed, but no substantial differences
between manipulated and non-manipulated reports were found
(Johansson et al. 2006). The lack of differentiation between
reasons given for an actual and a manipulated choice shows
that there is probably an element of confabulation in “truthful”
reporting as well. In addition to faces and abstract patterns
(Hall & Johansson 2008), choice blindness has been demon-
strated for taste and smell (Hall et al. 2010 in press), as well as
for moral and political opinion (Hall et al., in preparation).
Experiments on choice blindness support VH&T by providing
a dramatic example of the non-unitary nature of the mind; we
may have far less access to the reasons for our actions than we
think we do. But experiments on choice blindness also highlight
a possible problem lurking in VH&T’s conception of self-decep-
tion. Is it really possible to maintain two separate sets of con-
scious and non-conscious goals as a technique to deceive
oneself in order to better deceive someone else? For example,
in one version of the experiment described earlier, the partici-
pants had to choose between the same pairs of faces a second
time, as well as separately rate all the faces at the end of the
experiment. This procedure revealed that the manipulation
induced a pronounced, but to the participants unknown, prefer-
ence change, because they came to prefer the originally non-pre-
ferred face in subsequent choices, as well as rate the face they
were led to believe they liked higher than the one they thought
they rejected (Hall et al., in preparation). This result is of
course in line with a long tradition of studies showing the con-
structive nature of preferences, i.e. that we come to like what
we think we like (see Ariely & Norton 2008; Bem 1967; Festinger
1957; Lichtenstein & Slovic 2006).
The crucial point is that if it is possible to get people to reverse
their initial preferences by making them publicly endorse an
outcome they believe they prefer, then using self-deception as
a means to deceive others might result in fundamental changes
to the self as well. If I try to trick you into believing that I
prefer a over b, and the best way to do that is to also trick
myself into believing that I prefer a over b, I might actually
end up preferring a over b, at all levels of processing. In such a
case, it would be the conscious parts of the self that makes
the unconscious parts change, and in a process more akin to
self-persuasion than self-deception. The apparent ease with
which the participants in choice blindness experiments confabu-
late reasons in favor of a previously rejected alternative indicates
that this form of self-persuasion is something that comes quite
naturally to us.
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